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The Vernacular Concept of Innateness 
Paul Griffiths, Edouard Machery, Stefan Linquist. 
 
Abstract 
The proposal that the concept of innateness expresses a ‘folk biological’ theory of the 
‘inner natures’ of organisms was tested by examining the response of biologically naive 
subjects to a series of realistic scenarios concerning the development of birdsong. Our 
results explain the intuitive appeal of many of the existing philosophical analyses of the 
innateness concept. They simultaneously explain why all such analyses are subject to 
compelling counterexamples. We conclude that philosophers need to think more clearly 
about what they are trying to achieve when 'analysing' the concept of innateness. 
 
1. Innateness and Folk Biology 
It is a truism that the term ‘innate’ is vague and ambiguous. According to ethologist 
Patrick Bateson, “At least six meanings are attached to the term: present at birth; a 
behavioral difference caused by a genetic difference; adapted over the course of 
evolution; unchanging throughout development; shared by all members of a species; and 
not learned. … Say what you mean (even if it uses a bit more space) rather than 
unintentionally confuse your readers by employing a word such as innate that carries so 
many different connotations” (Bateson, 1991, p. 21-22). The rejection of the term ‘innate’ 
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on these grounds has a long and distinguished history in behavioral biology (Lehrman, 
1953; Hinde, 1968; Tinbergen, 1963), although some think that the harm done by these 
ambiguities has been exaggerated (Marler, 2004, p. 25-33). More recently, Matteo 
Mameli and Bateson have systematically reviewed the scientific use of the term 'innate' 
and identified no less than twenty-six proposed definitions. They judge eight of these to 
be both genuinely independent definitions and potentially valuable scientific constructs 
(Mameli and Bateson, 2006, p. 177-8). They conclude that unless it can be demonstrated 
that the eight properties picked out by these definitions are highly correlated with one 
another, something which they doubt on empirical grounds, we should accept that the 
term ‘innate’ is confusing and unhelpful. 
The term ‘innate’ nevertheless remains popular in psychology and cognitive 
science. Some philosophers have proposed that in these contexts it is primarily a device 
to say ‘not my department – ask a biologist’ (Samuels, 2002). But others continue to 
propose analyses of the concept of innateness, designed to show that there is a single, 
coherent notion of innateness that either does or should underlie the use of the term in the 
sciences of the mind (recent examples include Mallon and Weinberg, 2006; Ariew, 2006; 
Khalidi, 2007). These analyses are typically subject to intuitively compelling 
counterexamples from the proponents of alternative analyses (see Section 5).  
Our aim in this paper is to provide some solid evidence about the pre-scientific or 
vernacular understanding of term ‘innate’. As Mameli and Bateson (2006, p. 156) note, 
this has not previously been the subject of rigorous empirical investigation. In the 
remainder of this section we outline some ideas about ‘folk biology’, and in Section 2 we 
make a specific proposal about the structure of the vernacular innateness concept based 
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on these ideas. Section 3 reports an ‘experimental philosophy’ (X-phi) study testing this 
proposal. In Section 4, we argue that our results explain the intuitive appeal of many of 
the existing analyses of the concept. They simultaneously explain why all such analyses 
are subject to compelling counterexamples. In Section 5, we consider some replies and 
objections. We conclude that philosophers need to think more clearly about what they are 
trying to achieve when ‘analysing’ the concept of innateness.  
The vernacular concept of innateness finds its home in a broader folk biology. It 
is closely related to other concepts such as instinct and human nature. These are all part 
of pre-scientific efforts to describe and reason about the living world, efforts that are 
often described as making up a folk theory. ‘Folk theory’ is a fancy name for the views 
that non-scientists hold, either explicitly or implicitly, on topics that are also topics of 
scientific inquiry. For example, there is a folk physics of heat, according to which heat is 
a physical quantity more or less directly measurable by the intensity of subjective 
sensations of heat. In this conception of heat, the wooden handle of a snow-shovel is 
warmer than the metal shovel itself, and the marble slab in a fishmonger's shop is cooler 
than the wooden stand on which it rests. These beliefs give rise to the (correct) advice to 
hold the shovel by the handle and the (incorrect) advice that food will stay fresh longer if 
kept on the marble slab. The folk physics of heat served people fairly well until they 
developed technologies that required distinctions between temperature, quantity of heat 
and conductivity, and the folk theory persists today alongside the scientific theory. To use 
another example, folk dynamics is the body of beliefs which people unreflectively hold 
about the movement of three-dimensional, medium-sized objects. People tend to explain 
the movement of an object that has been thrown by ascribing to it some kind of impetus 
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(Clement, 1983; McCloskey, 1983). Needless to say, impetus-like forces have no place in 
Newtonian and post-Newtonian physics. 
Just as there are commonsense ideas about heat and dynamics, there are 
commonsense ideas about biology. Prominent amongst these is the idea that some traits 
are expressions of the inner nature of animals and plants, whilst other traits result from 
the influence of the environment. For example, dogs are bred for their colour and for their 
temperament, both of which are presumed to be part of their nature and thus inherited, 
but they are not bred for their attachment to a particular family, which is presumed to be 
the result of experience. The idea that living things have inner natures that make them the 
kind of organism that they are is intimately linked to the very idea of heredity. The 
hereditary traits of an animal are those that are passed on as part of its nature. Natures 
also explain the stability of some traits within a single lifetime – we do not expect a black 
sheep to grow white wool after shearing, because the colour of its wool is part of its 
nature.1  Like the folk theory of heat, folk-biological ideas work reasonably well for 
hunting, farming, and traditional stockbreeding. They are not adequate, however, for the 
purposes of scientific biology. The ecological and evolutionary trajectories of populations 
cannot be understood with a folk theory of heredity, and it is not possible to understand 
development using the folk theory of inner natures.  
 For over 20 years, psychologists and anthropologists have investigated the 
structure and development of folk biological concepts across a range of different 
                                                 
1 It may be that an organisms' nature can be altered by the environment in which it finds itself. Lamarckian 
theories of heredity which make this assumption seem to be highly intuitive. But this is a special, deep kind 
of alternation different in kind from the usual ways in which organisms are affected by the environment. 
Certain deeply ingrained habits become 'second nature' to people. In a typical Lamarckian theory, like that 
of Darwin (1872), it is only behaviors which are deeply ingrained for several generations that eventually 
become part of an organism's hereditary nature. 
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cultures.2  Although many key issues remain unresolved, a consensus has emerged that a 
core set of biological beliefs are commonly held by the folk.  We briefly outline the 
aspects of folk biology that, we suggest, are the likely source of people’s vernacular 
conception of innateness.   
 One widely documented feature of folk biological categories is that they are 
hierarchically structured (Berlin, Breedlove, and Raven, 1973; Atran, 1990; Berlin, 
1992). People everywhere identify (at least) three general levels of biological 
classification: a ‘generic species’ category (e.g., dogs and cedars), a super-ordinate 
category of biological domains (e.g., animals and plants), and a subordinate category of 
species varieties (e.g., particular breeds or strains).  From a cognitive point if view, not all 
levels of this taxonomy are equally significant.  The generic species rank is of particular 
importance.  Membership in a generic species is associated with what psychologists call 
‘psychological essentialism’ (Medin and Atran, 2004). People are psychological 
essentialists when they believe that membership in a biological kind is associated with a 
particular causal essence or inner nature – that is, some property or set of properties that 
define membership in a kind and cause members of the kind to possess kind-typical 
properties (Medin and Ortony, 1989; Atran, 1990; Gelman, 2003). The hypothesis that 
people are unreflectively essentialist is associated with at least two closely related beliefs 
that have been identified across a wide range of cultures.3  First, adults believe that 
membership in a species is a permanent property of an organism that is inherited by 
                                                 
2 (See, particularly, Carey, 1985; Keil, 1989; Atran, 1990; Medin and Atran, 1999, 2004; Astuti, Solomon, 
and Carey, 2004; Inagaki and Hatano, 2006)  
3 Some have challenged the claim that postulating a belief in causal essences was necessary to explain these 
phenomena (Strevens, 2000; Rips, 2001; Ahn et al., 2001). Be it as it may, the psychological phenomena 
themselves—a belief in a persistent species membership and a belief in inherited properties whose 
development is impervious to external influences —are not controversial. 
Submitted to Mind and Language  6 
descent and that is not affected by changes to its appearance.  For example, when asked 
to imagine a raccoon that has been surgically modified to look and smell like a skunk, 
adults maintain that the animal is still a raccoon (Keil, 1989; see also Rips, 1989; Atran et 
al., 2001 with Yukatek adults; Sousa, Atran, and Medin, 2002 with Brazilian adults). 
Second, and most important for our purposes, people believe that the development of 
species-typical traits does not depend on environmental influences.  For example, when 
asked to imagine a cow that has been raised by a family of pigs, adults assume that the 
cow will display the normal bovine traits (e.g. mooing instead of oinking) (Atran et al., 
2001; Sousa, Atran, and Medin, 2002).  In addition to psychological essentialism, Scott 
Atran (1995) has also proposed that folk biology has another core feature: the tendency to 
explain traits teleologically.  That is, people tend to explain the traits possessed by 
animals and plants by asserting that these traits have a purpose.    
 The suggestion that humans share a core set of folk biological beliefs raises a host 
of controversial issues.  There is some debate over the exact point in development at 
which these beliefs emerge, for example, and the extent of their cross-cultural similarity 
remains a matter of ongoing investigation.4 There is also a lingering question about the 
nature of the underlying psychological mechanism.  Some argue that psychological 
essentialism and the tendency to explain traits teleologically are generated by a domain-
specific module (Atran, 1995), whilst others attribute the formation of psychological 
essentialism to a more general-purpose reasoning ability (Gelman and Hirschfeld, 1999), 
and yet others attribute the formation of the tendency to explain traits teleologically to 
our disposition to provide intentional explanations (Kelemen, 1999, 2004).  Importantly, 
                                                 
4 On developmental and cultural issues, see (Keil, 1989; Gelman and Wellman, 1991; Atran et al., 2001; 
Sousa, Atran, and Medin, 2002; Astuti, Solomon, and Carey, 2004). 
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none of these more controversial issues bear on the hypothesis being investigated here.  
What is important for our purposes is that early on and across cultures, people believe 
that organisms possess inherited ‘inner natures’ that [1] cause them to possess species-
typical properties, [2] whose development is resistant to environmental influences, and 
[3] that are functional (they have a purpose).  Following Griffiths (2002), we hypothesize 
that the vernacular conception of innateness has its origin in these folk biological beliefs.  
That is, when the folk believe a trait is innate, what they believe is that it is an expression 
of an organism's inner nature, and hence that the trait will possess all or some 
combination of the three features of species-typicality, developmental fixity, and 
purposive function (hereafter: ‘Typicality’, ‘Fixity,’ and ‘Teleology’).   
 
2. The Three-Feature Theory of Innateness 
According to Griffiths (2002, p. 71), it is part of folk biology that three features are 
particularly associated with traits that are expressions of the inner nature that organisms 
inherit from their parents. These features are: 
1. Fixity – the trait is hard to change; its development is insensitive to environmental 
inputs in development; its development appears goal-directed, or resistant to 
perturbation. 
2. Typicality – the trait is part of what it is to be an organism of that kind; every 
individual has it, or every individual that is not malformed, or every individual of 
a certain age, sex or other natural subcategory. 
Submitted to Mind and Language  8 
3. Teleology – this is how the organism is meant to develop; to lack the innate trait 
is to be malformed; environments that disrupt the development of this trait are 
themselves abnormal. 
Griffiths described these three features in such broad terms in order to capture shared 
elements of the very different ideas about the inner natures of living things that are found 
in different human societies.5 Consider, for example, the feature which we have called 
‘Teleology’. The Darwinist will understand this as evolutionary design, whereas the 
creationist will understand it as God's intention. Each seeks to make sense in their own 
terms of an intuitive sense that an organism is meant to be a certain way whether or not it 
actually turns out that way. In the seventeenth century, the anatomist William Harvey 
dealt with the same fundamental intuition by supposing that the “idea or form” of the 
organism provided by the male parent is sometimes misinterpreted by the “formative 
faculty” of the female parent's womb (Harvey, 1989, p. 578).  It is the underlying 
intuition shared by all three theorists that we regard as an expression of folk biology, and 
in particular of the folk-biological conception of inner natures. 
We cannot sufficiently stress that we are not proposing to define innateness with a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions called Typicality, Fixity and Teleology. The 
three-feature theory has a similar status to accounts of specific concepts developed by 
psychologists and cognitive anthropologists. It treats the vernacular concept of innateness 
as a cognitive structure (or a mental representation) that has its origin in folk biology. If 
the three-feature theory is correct, then the cognitive structure that underpins the use of 
                                                 
5 In his 2002 paper Griffiths referred to the three features as 'developmental fixity,' 'species nature,' and 
'intended outcome'. In this paper we use the handier terms 'Fixity,' 'Typicality,' and 'Teleology,' and we 
reserve the term 'nature' for the broader idea that organisms have an underlying nature of which innate traits 
are an expression.  
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the term 'innate' is an implicit theory that views organisms as having inner natures which 
are expressed in traits that are likely to be Typical, Fixed and Teleological. 
 The aim of the present study is to test the three-feature theory by examining how 
people actually apply the concept of innateness.  The three feature theory makes claims 
about folk biology, not about the ideas that people derive from scientific biology. Thus, 
the study asks specifically whether non-scientists use the innateness concept in the 
manner predicted by the three-feature theory. If innateness judgments are indeed 
influenced by these three features in the way we have suggested, then two predictions 
should follow: 
1. The association of each of the three features with a trait increases the likelihood 
that subjects will identify that trait as innate. 
2. All three features will contribute independently to subjects’ judgments about 
whether a trait is innate.  
Note that prediction two is stronger and more risky than prediction one.  It is a 
direct consequence of our hypothesis that the three features in question (Typicality, 
Fixity, and Teleology) contribute additively to judgments about whether some trait is 
innate.  Suppose that we are wrong, and that people only take one feature – Fixity, for 
example – to be characteristic of traits which express inner natures.  But, suppose also 
that people use the other two features as suggestive cues for whether the defining feature 
is present (perhaps because they believe that the corresponding properties tend to co-
occur).  This alternative to the three-feature theory predicts an interaction among the 
three features.  Direct evidence that the trait is not Fixed will reduce the influence of 
evidence that the trait is Typical or Teleological on the final judgment about its 
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innateness.  An analogy may make this point clearer: seeing a Prada logo on a handbag 
strongly influences the judgment that it is a Prada handbag.  But independent evidence 
that it is not a Prada bag – for example, the fact that it is being sold in a street market in 
Jakarta for the equivalent of one U.S. dollar – reduces the influence of the logo on 
judgments about the brand.  
We should also stress that we not proposing that only three, simple cues affect 
judgments of innateness. It seems clear, for example, that being present at birth and not 
being learnt are cues which people use to identify traits as innate. But we suggest that 
these and many other specific cues can be understood in terms of the three broad intuitive 
aspects of innateness which we have identified. The significance of presence at birth and 
not being learnt, for example, is that they provide evidence that the trait is insensitive to 
the environment and is developing as if guided by some internal goal—that is, evidence 
that the trait has the folk-biological feature that we have labeled 'Fixity.' 
 
3. Testing the Three-feature Theory of Innateness 
3.1. Materials 
To test the prediction that Fixity, Typicality and Teleology are additive factors positively 
affecting judgments of innateness, we studied whether people judge eight examples of 
birdsong to be innate behaviors. We chose birdsong because it offers the opportunity to 
find real, or at least realistic, examples of the eight possible combinations of the three 
factors under consideration (Table 1). There are over nine thousand species of birds and 
song learning has been the focus of intense investigation since the groundbreaking work 
of William Thorpe and Peter Marler in the1950s (for an accessible introduction, see 
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Marler and Slabbekorn, 2004). Although the participants in our experiment had no 
expertise in biology or in any behavioral science, we hope to use these materials in later 
studies with scientists and feedback from scientists involved in other 'experimental 
philosophy' studies suggests that they are unwilling to devote time and effort to thinking 
about unrealistic cases (Griffiths and Karola Stotz, personal communication). 
In four cases, we used a bird which is known to acquire its song in a manner 
corresponding exactly to one of the boxes in Table 1. We failed to find a bird for the 
remaining four cases. For these remaining cases we used a speciose genus where some 
species are known to acquire their song in a manner very close to what we required. We 
invented a new species of that genus which fitted our requirements, and made up 
plausible common and scientific names for that species. One of our species is the Pale-
headed Thornbird (Phacellodomus pallida). Unless you are a keen birder with expertise 
in the relevant region, we doubt that you can tell whether this is one of the real species.  
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Table 1: The Eight Possible Combinations of Fixity, Typicality and Teleology 
 
  Typical ~Typical 
Design feature 
(Teleology) 
Combination 8 
Design feature 
Combination 6 
 
Fixed 
Accident 
(~Teleology) 
Combination 7 
Accident 
Combination 4 
 
Design feature 
Combination 5 
Design feature 
Combination 2 
Plastic 
Accident 
Combination 3 
Accident 
Combination 1 
 
 
The eight probes describing the examples of birdsong each have the same 
structure. The probe begins with a standard paragraph about research on birdsong, 
designed to convince subjects that there is a wealth of well-established scientific 
knowledge about birdsong. The next paragraph begins with one or two sentences naming 
a specific bird and providing some neutral information about it. This is designed to 
convince subjects that this is a real animal. The remainder of this paragraph states 
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whether the song of the male of this species is Fixed, Typical, Teleological or their 
opposites, using one of each of these pairs of statements: 
Fixed/Plastic 
0. Studies on ___________ show that the song an adult male produces depends on 
   which songs they hear when they are young.   
1. Studies on ___________ show that the song an adult male produces does not 
depend on which songs they hear when they are young.   
Typical/~Typical 
0. Studies also show that different males in this species sing different songs.  
1. Studies also show that all males of this species sing the same song. 
Teleology/~Teleology 
0. Close observations of these birds reveal that the males’ song is not used to 
attract mates nor to defend territories. Scientists therefore agree that this feature of 
the bird has no real function, like the appendix in humans.    
1. Close observations of these birds reveal that the males’ song attracts mates and 
helps to defend their territory. Scientists therefore agree that this feature of the 
bird has a real function, like the heart in humans.  
To control for order effects, we presented the information about Typicality, Fixity, and 
Teleology in three different orders—Typicality-Fixity-Teleology (order 1), Teleology-
Typicality-Fixity (order 2), Fixity-Teleology-Typicality (order 3)—resulting in 24 
different probes.6 
 To illustrate, the probe describing a species of bird in which birdsong is not-
Typical, is Fixed, and has a Function, with the items presented in order 1, read as follows: 
                                                 
6 Probes and full datasets are available at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu (not posted until article is accepted) 
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Birdsong is one of the most intensively studied aspects of animal behaviour. Since 
the 1950s scientists have used recordings and sound spectograms to uncover the 
structure and function of birdsong. Neuroscientists have investigated in great 
detail the areas of the brain that allow birds to develop and produce their songs. 
Other scientists have done ecological fieldwork to study what role song plays in 
the lives of different birds.   
The Alder Flycatcher (Empidonax alnorum) is a migratory neo-tropical bird 
which breeds in southern Canada and the northern USA. Studies on the Alder 
Flycatcher show that the song an adult male produces does not depend on which 
songs they hear when they are young. Studies also show that different males in 
this species sing different songs. Furthermore, close observations of these birds 
reveal that the males’ song attracts mates and helps to defend their territory. 
Scientists therefore agree that the bird's song has a real function, like the heart in 
humans. 
On a 7-point scale, 1 meaning strongly disagree and 7 meaning strongly agree, 
how would you respond to the following statement? 
 ‘The song of the male Alder Flycatcher is innate.’ 
 
It should be noted that a substantial amount of interpretation is involved in 
reducing the three hypothesized features associated with innateness to these three 
information items. Our interpretation of Fixity reflects the general tenor of the birdsong 
literature, in which the songs of sub-oscine passerine birds are traditionally described as 
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'innate' because, unlike the oscine passerines, their development does not depend on 
exposure to correct song. Our interpretation of Typicality ignores the idea that a variable 
song might be an evolved polymorphism like eye colour. Our interpretation of Teleology 
as having a 'real function' was driven by the need to remain neutral between evolutionary 
and creationist conceptions of teleology. The examples of organs that have and do not 
have a 'real function' (respectively, heart and appendix) were included to ensure that 
subjects interpreted 'real function' in the sense we intended. It seems plausible that typical 
North American subjects will be familiar with these two examples. 
 
3.2 Subjects and Procedure 
255 individuals taking classes at the University of Pittsburgh took part in the experiment. 
10 subjects were not native speakers of English and 1 subject did not specify whether she 
was a native speaker of English. These 11 subjects were removed from the data set, 
resulting in a sample of 244 subjects (mean age: 20.9; range: 18-40; 50.8% males). In 
classroom settings, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 24 probes (Table 2). 
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Table 2: Number of Subjects per Combination per Order 
 
  Order  
  1 2 3 Total 
Combination 1 12 10 6 28 
 2 19 9 6 34 
 3 15 9 6 30 
 4 15 10 4 29 
 5 16 11 3 30 
 6 15 9 7 31 
 7 17 9 6 32 
 8 17 8 5 30 
Total  126 75 43 244 
 
 
Subjects read a single probe. They had to answer the innateness question by 
circling a numeral on a 7-point scale, anchored at 1 with ‘totally disagree’ and at 7 with 
‘totally agree’. Subjects were also asked to fill a short demographic questionnaire. This 
asked for their education level in biology and in psychology as well as for their general 
propensity to favour ‘biological’ over ‘environmental’ explanations of human behavior. 
We found no meaningful relation between either our subjects’ education level in biology 
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and in psychology or their propensity to favour biological over environmental 
explanations and their answer to the innateness question.   
 
3.3 Results 
 To test the three-feature theory of innateness, we performed a standard multiple 
regression analysis between the dependent variable (answer to the innateness question) 
and the three predictor variables (Typicality, Fixity, Teleology).7 Taken together, the 
three predictors significantly predict subjects’ answer to the innateness question (F(3, 
240) = 13.62, p < .001). These three predictors explain a moderate portion of the 
variance, R2 = .15 (adjusted R2 = .14). This corresponds to a medium effect size (Cohen, 
1992). 
Among our three predictors, Typicality (B = 1.18; β = .33, t = 5.55, p < .001) and 
Fixity (B = .59; β = .17, t = 2.81, p < .01) each significantly predicts subjects’ answer to 
the innateness question. Teleology (B = .33; β = .09, t = 1.16, p = .12) does not 
significantly predict subjects’ answer to the innateness question, but the trend is 
suggestive. 
We also used hierarchical multiple regression to test the independent contribution 
of each predictor. Typicality was entered in the first block, Fixity in the second block, 
and Teleology in the third block. The results are similar to the previous analysis (Figure 
1). Typicality explains 2.5 percent of variance in subjects’ answer to the innateness 
question, which is significant (F(1, 242) = 7.14, p < .01). When Fixity is added in the 
second step, it explains an additional 10.8 percent of variance, a significant increase (F(1, 
                                                 
7 The assumptions of multiple regression were tested. The predictors are linearly related to the dependent 
variable, there was no multicollinearity, and the error is normally distributed and uncorrelated with the 
predictors. 
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241) = 30.20, p < .001). When Teleology is added in the last step, it explains an 
additional .9 percent of variance, a non-significant, but suggestive, increase (F(1, 240) = 
2.43, p = .12).  
 
Figure 1: Proportion of the Variance Independently Predicted 
by Fixity, Typicality and Teleology. 
Fixity
Typicality
Teleology
Other
 
 To study the interactions between our three predictors, we used an ANOVA with 
Fixity, Typicality, and Teleology as factors. As expected from the two previous analyses, 
we found a main effect of Fixity (Fixed > ~Fixed, F(1, 236) = 29.86, p < .001) and 
Typicality (Typical > ~Typical, F(1, 236) = 7.63, p < .01). There was no significant effect 
for Teleology (F(1, 236) = 2.41, p = .12) and, importantly for our purposes, no interaction 
(see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Subjects’ Mean Answer to the Innateness Question as a Function of 
Typicality, Fixity and Teleology.   
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Note that the strong effect of Fixity on Mean Innateness is not significantly influenced by 
Universality or Function, indicating that these three features do not interact.  
 Finally, to study the effect of outliers, we eliminated the data points that were 
above and beyond two standard deviations from the mean in each combination. 5 data 
points were removed. We performed again a standard multiple regression analysis 
between the dependent variable and the three predictor variables. The results were overall 
very similar to our previous analyses. Taken together, the three predictors significantly 
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predict subjects’ answer to the innateness question (F(3, 235) = 19.89, p < .001). These 
three predictors explain a greater portion of the variance than in the previous regression 
analysis, R2 = .20 (adjusted R2 = .19). Again, Typicality and Fixity, but not Teleology, 
significantly predict subjects’ answer to the innateness question. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The three-feature theory of innateness is substantially, though not perfectly, supported by 
these results. Together, the three predictors explain 14% of the variance in subjects’ 
answers to the innateness question.  
Typicality and Fixity independently explain part of the variance in subjects’ 
answers to the innateness question.  There is also no interaction between these two 
predictors. Thus, whether a trait is typical of a given species and whether the 
development of this trait is canalized are two independent features that influence people 
when they decide whether a trait is innate.  
Fixity turned out to be a more important factor than Typicality.  Typicality alone 
explains only 2.5% of the variance in subjects’ answers to the innateness question, while 
when Fixity is added to Typicality, it explains an additional 11% of the variance.  Thus, 
when people decide whether a trait is innate, the Fixity of a trait matters more than its 
Typicality.  
 The three-feature theory of innateness is only partially supported by our results, 
because Teleology turned out not to be a significant predictor of the variance in subjects’ 
answer to the innateness question. Thus, we found no clear evidence that the functional 
significance of a trait is a relevant factor when people decide whether this trait is innate. 
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We see three obvious mutually exclusive explanations of this result. First, we may simply 
be wrong in assuming that the function of a trait is one of the cues that people use to 
decide whether this trait is innate. In support of this first explanation, one might argue 
that by contrast to the folk expectations that some biological traits are both species typical 
and developmentally canalized, the folk expectation that biological traits have a function 
does not originate in folk biology. True, adults and children do provide teleological 
explanations of the physiological traits possessed by animals. But, if, as some 
psychologists have argued (Kelemen, 1999, 2004), the tendency to explain teleologically 
does not originate in folk biology and if folk biology is the source of the vernacular 
concept of innateness, function might not be a cue used by the folk to decide whether a 
trait is innate.  
A second, alternative explanation is that, while it is part of folk-biology that 
innate traits are how organisms are 'meant to be' (Teleology), this is not adequately 
expressed by the claim that innate traits have a function. Griffiths's original (2002) 
proposal was inspired by the widespread assumption that an organism which fully 
expresses its inner nature is somehow better than one which does not, and that only ill-
effects can come from interfering with the expression of an organisms' true nature. The 
original meaning of ‘monster’ (terata) is, after all, an organism in which the form of the 
species has failed to impress itself on recalcitrant matter. These ideas may simply not be 
adequately represented by the information we provided about whether a trait has a 
function. 
 There is a third, simpler explanation that is also consistent with the three-feature 
theory of innateness. In our probes, when we gave information about the functional 
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significance of birdsong, we compared birdsong to a biological organ both when birdsong 
was functional and when it was not. We compared birdsong to the heart in the former 
case and to the appendix in the latter case. Now, subjects might believe that the heart and 
the appendix are both innate traits of humans. If this is the case, our very probes 
inadvertently suggested that function was irrelevant to decide whether a trait was innate. 
This explanation can easily be tested, by eliminating the comparisons from our current 
probes. We intend to do this test in a follow-up study. For now, we note that this third 
explanation is tentatively supported by the fact that in spite of comparing both functional 
and non-functional birdsong to a human organ, the relation between subjects’ answer to 
the innateness question and the predictor function was not far from significance. 
Furthermore, Figure 2 shows that whether a trait was functional did influence subjects’ 
answer to the innateness question, except when the trait was neither universal nor 
canalized.  
 Our three predictors taken together explain 14 percent of the variance in subjects’ 
answer to the innateness question (19% when the outliers were removed from the data 
set), corresponding to a medium effect size (Cohen, 1992). One might wonder why they 
do not explain a larger part of the variance if the three-feature theory of innateness is true. 
There are at least three mutually consistent, explanations of this moderate effect.  
Because some subjects might have not have known the meaning of ‘innate’, they 
might have answered randomly or given the answer 4 (the middle of the scale) 
independently of the combination they were presented with. These data points could not 
be removed from the data set. Moreover, some subjects might have been reticent to apply 
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the term ‘innate’ to behaviors, because they might have believed that only psychological 
capacities or traits are innate—not behaviors. 
 Finally, and most important, some subjects might have had some background 
beliefs about birdsong. They might have been told in high school or college, or they 
might have read, that birdsong is innate or, alternatively, that it is learned. This might 
have led them to answer the innateness question independently of the three elements of 
information that had been given to them. As a result, the answer of these subjects 
probably contributed to the proportion of the variance that is not accounted by the three 
predictors under consideration. Given that many subjects have probably at least some 
inchoate beliefs about whether birdsong is innate or not, the medium effect size in our 
findings is actually quite surprising. 
 This explanation suggests the following line of research. If our three predictors 
failed to explain a larger part of the variance because some subjects had some 
background beliefs about the innateness nature of birdsong, our three predictors should 
explain a larger proportion of variance in subjects’ answer to the innateness question, if 
birdsong were replaced by a behavior that subjects have never heard of. To prevent 
subjects to answer on the basis of their background beliefs, psychologists working on 
induction typically use what they call ‘blank predicates.’ These are made-up predicates 
that refer to fictional properties such as ‘require biotin for protein synthesis’ (Osherson et 
al., 1990). Similarly, in future research, we intend to replicate our experiment, replacing 
the behavioral trait ‘birdsong’ with a ‘blank’ behavioral trait for which subjects would 
have no or few background beliefs. 
 
4. Implications for Existing Analyses of Innateness 
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Our results explain some aspects of the philosophical literature on innateness. Each 
analysis fixes on one or two aspects of the vernacular concept of innateness, leaving itself 
open to counterexamples which appeal to intuitions derived from the other aspects. 
 
4.1 Analyses of Innateness Based on Typicality8 
Stephen Stich's seminal paper ‘The idea of innateness (1975) contained a number of 
tentative suggestions about the structure of the concept. One is that an innate trait might 
be defined as one that a person will manifest in the normal course of human development.  
Stich offered a counterexample to this analysis: universally held beliefs, such as the belief 
that water quenches thirst, will count as innate on this analysis whereas intuitively they 
are acquired (Stich, 1975, p. 9). André Ariew has offered another counterexample: 
humans acquire a typical gut flora during development, but these bacteria are intuitively 
acquired rather than innate features of humans (Ariew, 1999, p. 133). Ariew has also 
suggested that Stich's analysis derives its plausibility from the assumption that if a trait is 
species-typical, then there is some mechanism that ensures its presence (Ariew, 2006, p. 
10). Following this critical tradition, we will treat Stich as suggesting that a trait is innate 
just in case it is typical of normal development. In the same vein, other authors have 
suggested that ‘innate’ means ‘shared by all members of the species’ (Bateson, 1991). 
The proposal that a trait is innate just in case it is typical of normal development 
appeals to the folk biological idea that traits which express an organism's inner nature 
will typify that species. Our results show clearly that judgments of innateness are 
                                                 
8 Recall that the capitalized terms Typicality, Fixed, and Teleological refer to the elements of folk-
biological theory discussed in Sections two and three, and are being used here strictly in this, stipulated 
sense. 
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influenced by information about Typicality, so it is unsurprising that suitably chosen 
thought experiments evoke intuitions that favour this analysis.  However, our results also 
show that judgments of innateness are influenced by information about Fixity, so it is 
equally unsurprising that the thought experiments listed above, both of which make 
salient the dependence of typical traits on interaction with the environment, evoke 
intuitions hostile to the analysis.  
 
4.2 Analyses of Innateness Based on Teleology 
Another popular analysis of innateness suggests that a trait is innate if its development is 
guided by 'inherited information' rather than 'environmental information.' This was also 
suggested by Stich (1975, 13-16), but has been defended primarily by Muhammad Ali 
Khalidi (2002; 2007). Both Stich and Khalidi restrict the analysis to innate cognitive 
traits: ‘…a belief (concept, idea, capacity) may be considered to be innate to the degree 
that it would emerge as the result of an impoverished stimulus’ (Khalidi, 2002, p. 269). 
Both Stich and Khalidi were unaware that this account of innateness was at the heart of 
Konrad Lorenz's 1965 book Evolution and the Modification of Behaviour. It replaced 
Lorenz's much criticized 1937 account of innateness based on the deprivation 
experiment.9 Any analysis along these lines must specify what is meant by 'information', 
something which is not at all obvious (Stich, 1975, p. 15). Lorenz identified 'information' 
in this context with adaptive fit. He saw no reason to restrict the analysis to cognitive 
traits, since all adaptive traits 'fit' the environment and hence can be said to contain 
information about that environment. If a person has calluses on their palms rather than on 
the backs of their hands, then these calluses contain information about where their skin 
                                                 
9 For more on Lorenz's 1965 theory, see (Browne, 2005). 
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gets rubbed. If they form calluses on their palms more easily than on the backs of their 
hands (or if, like the ostrich, they are born with calluses already formed in convenient 
places) and if these traits fit their future environments, then those traits contain 
information about what the future environments will be like. This anticipatory 
information, Lorenz argues, must have been in the genome, and must have been absorbed 
from ancestral environments. 
Lorenz's analysis can readily be expressed in information-theoretic terms, with the 
environment as the signal source and the organism as the receiver.  Organisms need to 
reduce their uncertainty about what demands the environment will place on them and to 
develop in a way that meets those demands. There are two ways to do this. One is gather 
information during development. The water flea Daphnia pulex monitors chemical traces 
of predators as it develops and grows defensive armour if predators are indicated. The 
other way is to inherit information from your ancestors. The sickle cell allele, a costly 
trait which confers resistance against malaria, carries information about the prevalence of 
malaria in the ancestral environment and thus, probably, in the environment of the 
organism which inherits it. To the extent that the functional adjustment of a trait to its 
environment is explained by 'inherited information' of this kind, Lorenz argued, the trait 
is innate.   
Stripped of its colourful language, the 'inherited information' analysis amounts to 
the claim that a trait is innate if its fit to the environment can only be explained by 
evolutionary adaptation (or by divine providence, if you swing that way). There would 
seem to be two ways to explain the intuitive appeal of this analysis. First, it may reflect 
an inchoate assumption that if something is an adaptation, then it must be Fixed and/or 
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Typical. Second, it may be part of folk biology that traits which are part of an organism's 
inner nature are design features, representing how the organism is meant to develop. Our 
data showed only a weak, suggestive effect for Teleology in driving judgments of 
innateness, but it is certainly too soon to dismiss the idea that Teleology matters for folk 
judgments about innate traits. However its appeal is to be explained, the analysis is open 
to counterexamples based on Typicality or Fixity. For example, the massively over-
grown jaw typical of the inbred Hapsburg royal family was innate - the Hapsburg's were 
innately hideous - but this was not an adaptation.  
 
4.3 Analyses of Innateness Based on Fixity 
A third class of analyses identifies innateness with Fixity: innate traits are those like the 
Hapsburg jaw which are hard to change. This view has been ably defended by Andre 
Ariew, who argues that traits are innate to the extent that they exhibit environmental 
canalisation (Ariew, 1996, 1999, 2006). The concept of canalisation derives from the 
mid-20th century embryologist and theoretical biologist Conrad H. Waddington. A trait is 
genetically canalised to the extent that it will develop despite variations in the organism's 
genome. It is environmentally canalised to the extent that it will develop despite variation 
in the organism’s environment. It is canalised simpliciter to the extent that both of these 
are true (Griffiths, 2006). Innateness-as-canalisation is a matter of degree. A trait is more 
innate the more environmental parameters its development is buffered against and the 
wider the range of variation in those parameters against which it is buffered. 
Our data suggest that intuitions about innateness respond more strongly to 
information about Fixity than to information about Typicality or Teleology. Innateness-
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as-canalisation should therefore fit people's intuitions about innateness better than other 
analyses.10 Despite this, however, analyses which identify innateness with Fixity remain 
subject to intuitive counterexamples that trade on intuitions derived from those other 
features. Consider the penile reflexes of the rat. Celia Moore (1992; 1984) has shown that 
the spinal cord nuclei of male rats differ from those of female rats in ways that allow the 
male to use his penis during copulation. These neural differences result from differences 
in gene expression in the developing spinal cord of the rat pup, which in turn result from 
differences in the amount of licking of the genital area by the mother, which in turn 
results from greater expression of a chemical that elicits maternal licking in male pups. 
According to innateness-as-canalisation, these experiments show that the rat's ability to 
copulate is not innate: 
‘Distinguish between two reasons why the trait appears invariantly in an 
environmental range: the first, because an environmental condition is 
developmentally required yet is found everywhere the system develops; the 
second, because the system develops independently of the environmentally 
condition. Innateness should be identified with the second sort of invariance, not 
the first.’ (Ariew, 2006, p. 10) 
We do not think that intuitions about the penile reflex case follow this 
prescription. Our data support this hunch. One of our examples of birdsong is the Black-
                                                 
10 We believe that this reveals something important about the concept of innateness vis-à-vis other concepts 
that reflect the underlying folk-theory of biological natures, such as the concepts of instinct and of human 
nature.  These concepts may place different weightings on the three aspects of the folk-conception of 
biological natures which we described above. The readiness with which people speak of diseases as 'innate' 
already suggests that Teleology is not as heavily weighted in innateness as it is in instinct or human nature. 
It would seem perverse to express a strongly hereditarian view of autism, for example, by saying that 
autistic behaviors are 'instinctive'. If this suggestion about alternative weightings is correct it should be 
possible to demonstrate this in future research by comparing the application of the different concepts to the 
same set of examples. We intend to study this issue in future research. 
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Capped Chickadee (Parus atricapillus) (combination 5 in Table 2). Despite the wide 
geographic range of the chickadee, its morning ‘fee-bee’ song is invariant throughout the 
species. But males must be exposed to species typical song in order to acquire that song 
themselves. With this probe we gave subjects exactly the evidence Ariew takes to show 
that a trait is not innate – ‘an environmental condition is developmentally required yet is 
found everywhere the system develops’ – but our subjects regard the song as innate. 
Their modal answer was 5 on our 7-point scale and our analysis shows that their 
responses were influenced by the information that the song is Typical.  
Our data showed that people rely on the typicality of a trait and on its universality 
to decide whether it is innate. More tentatively, people may also rely on whether the trait 
has a function. In this section we have shown that many proposed analyses of the concept 
have focused on one of these three features, and have left themselves open to 
counterexamples which rely on intuitions about innateness derived from the other two 
features. Some more recent analyses seem to draw on two features, which naturally 
increases their adequacy (e.g. Mallon and Weinberg, 2006). An analysis that could 
survive the philosophical activity of offering intuitive counterexamples unscathed, 
however, would have to include at least Fixity and Typicality, might also have to include 
Teleology, and would have to weight the different features correctly against one another.  
 
5. Objections and Replies 
5.1 We are Analysing Scientists' Concept, Not the Folk Concept 
Philosophers committed to one of the accounts of innateness discussed in Section 4 may 
object that they are not trying to analyze the folk concept of innateness. Rather, they 
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might be attempting to analyze the concept of innateness used by scientists or by some 
specific group of scientists. For example, Samuels (2002) describes his project as an 
attempt to analyze the concept of innateness used by cognitive scientists, particularly in 
the controversies spurred by Chomsky’s poverty of stimulus argument. 
 We are sympathetic to the project of understanding how scientists think about 
innateness. But if this is the really the project Samuels and others are engaged in, their 
methods suffers from serious shortcomings. Philosophers often use thought experiments 
that tap into their own or the folk’s intuitions. Both Samuels (2002) or Mallon and 
Weinberg (2006) make some use of intuitions about examples. If their goal really is to 
analyze scientists’ concept of innateness, this common methodology should be 
abandoned. Why would philosophers’ or the folk’s unreflective judgments about 
innateness matter to how, say, generative syntacticians think about innateness? 
Philosophers also regularly rely on outlandish thought experiments, such as the 
spontaneous acquisition of the capacity to read or understand Latin after having ingested 
the famed Latin pill (Fodor 1975; Samuels 2002; Mallon and Weinberg 2006). This kind 
of thought-experiment is probably of little use for understanding scientists’ concept of 
innateness, because the intuitions (if any) triggered among scientists by these thought-
experiments may have little to do with the concept of innateness they rely on as scientists.  
When they are not dealing with intuitions elicited by thought-experiments, 
philosophers assume that their analysis of a scientific concept is supported if it casts some 
light on some scientific episode involving that concept or on some body of scientific 
literature (e.g., the writings of some prominent scientist). For instance, an analysis of the 
concept of innateness in cognitive science is supported if it casts some light on the 
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debates spurred by Chomsky’s poverty of stimulus argument or on Chomsky’s writings. 
This method is certainly valuable, particularly to study the concepts entertained by 
scientists in the past or the concepts formed by some specific scientist. But, it also has 
some major shortcomings. Several different accounts of the concept of innateness might 
cast some light on the relevant scientific episode(s) and writings. When this happens, it is 
unclear how we can choose between these accounts in a principled manner. Furthermore, 
this methodology is irreducibly subjective. There is no way to measure how well an 
account of a given concept illuminates a scientific episode or a body of scientific 
literature. So, once again, disagreements often cannot be settled. 
By contrast, the method we used in this article to study the folk concept of 
innateness can be naturally expanded to study scientists’ concept(s) of innateness. 
Scientists’ judgments about the innateness of birdsongs can be surveyed in the same way 
as we surveyed folk judgments. In contrast to philosophers’ attempt to cast some light on 
specific scientific episodes, such surveys can systematically and objectively examine the 
cues scientists use when they apply a concept. Furthermore, in contrast to the strange 
thought experiments often favored by philosophers, biologically realistic probes, such as 
the probes we developed, can be used. Indeed, we plan in future research to survey the 
judgments of psychologists, biologists, linguists, and others, using the very probes we 
used in the present study. 
 
5.2. We are Trying to Reform the Folk Concept, Not Analyse It 
Some philosophers see themselves as reforming the folk notion of innateness in order for 
this notion to play a useful role in science or in some specific science. Although he 
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sometimes appeal to untutored intuitions in the way we have just objected to, Ariew 
(1996, 1999, 2006) is best understood as proposing to identify innateness with Fixity 
(environmental canalization) because such a reformed concept of innateness would be 
useful in biology and psychology. 
We are unconvinced by this project. Suppose the point of reforming the folk 
concept of innateness is really to provide biologists with a useful concept. First, 
biologists and psychologists already have such a concept, namely the concept of 
canalization, and they already have a word that expresses that concept, namely 
‘canalized.’ As Bateson (1991) and Griffiths (2002) have already asked, if your goal is to 
mean canalized when you say ‘innate,’ why not just say ‘canalized’? Furthermore, our 
findings show that by ‘innate,’ the folk do not merely mean ‘canalized’. By using the 
term ‘innate’ instead of ‘canalized,’ biologists who follow Ariew’s reformist suggestion 
would systematically increase the risk of miscommunication between themselves, other 
biologists, and the public at large. When Robin Andreasen (1998) and Philip Kitcher 
(1999) proposed to reform the concept of race so that the word ‘race’ would become 
synonymous with the word ‘clade’ (or with the expression ‘breeding population’), Joshua 
Glasgow (2003) and others were quick to note that since the term ‘race’ as used by the 
folk has specific connotations, this proposal would lead to dangerous misunderstandings 
among the lay consumers of science. A similar argument applies to reformist proposals 
for ‘innate,’ although the anticipated danger is obviously less catastrophic. 
5.3 Innateness is a 'Homeostatic Property Cluster' 
We have argued that the innateness concept is associated with three logically independent 
features. It might still be a valuable construct if those three were bound together reliably, 
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so that each was to some extent a predictor of the others. Innate traits might be like 
market economies – each different in various ways, but similar enough to be worth 
distinguishing as a type from command economies. It is natural here to appeal to Richard 
Boyd's influential idea of a 'homeostatic property cluster' (Boyd, 1991). Many scientific 
categories, Boyd argues, refer to a cluster of properties none of which need be present in 
every instance of the category, but whose regular co-occurrence reflects causal processes 
which connect them in various ways. Although they do not use Boyd's terminology, 
Mameli and Bateson (2006) have provided the most substantial discussion of this idea to 
date. As discussed above, they identified eight viable scientific constructs that have been 
proposed as explications of the vernacular idea of innateness. They call these the 'i-
properties.' They argue that it will be useful to retain the term 'innate' only if the eight 'i-
properties' are highly correlated with one another. If they are not, then the retention of the 
term can only lead to confusion and fallacies of ambiguity, as Bateson suggested fifteen 
years earlier. Mameli and Bateson maintain that the links between the i-properties are 
matters for empirical investigation and that until there is good evidence that the i-
properties are highly correlated scientists should eschew the term 'innate,’ since its 
continued use hides the fact that we do not know whether the i-properties are highly 
correlated. 
The fact that the term ‘innate’ is an expression of folk biology should make us 
even more suspicious of its continued appeal. In our experience, philosophers presented 
with standard critiques of the concept of innateness from behavioral biology are rarely 
impressed because it seems intuitively obvious to them that the various aspects of 
innateness, whilst theoretically separable, all go together. But this intuition is merely an 
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expression of the folk theory of inner natures which philosophers, as much as anyone 
else, make use of in their everyday lives. It is not at all obvious that Fixity, Typicality and 
Teleology are closely related. There are innumerable well-researched examples of 
disassociations that, from a folk biological point of view, appear paradoxical (Michel and 
Moore, 1995; Bateson and Martin, 1999).  Moreover, there are sound theoretical reasons 
why we might expect these three features not to be associated. Amongst these are: 
1.  Natural selection has no particular bias towards producing traits that are species-
typical (monomorphic). Many important traits in humans and other organisms are 
genetically maintained polymorphisms, either as a result of frequency dependent 
selection or as a response to variation in the environment across the species' range 
(ecotypes). Natural selection also frequently produces phenotypic plasticity, in which the 
developmental system responds to the environment with a range of traits, as in the 
example of the water flea Daphnia pulex given above. Conversely, developmental 
constraints give rise to species-typical traits which are not adaptations. 
2. Natural selection does not select for mechanisms which buffer traits against variation 
in the environment unless variation of that kind regularly occurs in the environments in 
which the species lives. In fact, any buffering mechanism which is not actively being 
used will tend to decay by mutation. One example is the inability of humans and their 
relatives to synthesise ascorbic acid (vitamin C). The ascorbic acid synthesis pathway 
was disabled by mutation during the long period in which our fruit-eating ancestors had 
no chance of developing vitamin C deficiences (Jukes and King, 1975). As Terence 
Deacon has nicely put it, organisms are in 'addicted to' innumerable aspects of their 
environments, from ascorbic acid, to gravity, to social interactions (Deacon, 1997). In 
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less colourful terms, the development of evolved traits assumes the presence of an 
'ontogenetic niche' (West and King, 1987) which supports and enables the normal 
expression of the genome.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We have shown experimentally that judgments of innateness are independently 
influenced by two features, Fixity and Typicality, with the former weighted more heavily 
than the later. We have produced suggestive evidence that a third feature, Teleology, may 
also play a role. We have argued that existing philosophical analyses of the innateness 
concept are inadequate because they try to make do with only one of these features and 
ignore the weighting issue. We conclude more broadly that the project of ‘conceptually 
analysing’ an idea like innateness faces a dilemma. If conceptual analysis aims to capture 
the concept used by the folk or by some specialist community, empirical methods are 
more powerful than the traditional ‘method of counterexamples.’  If it aims to replace the 
existing concept with a more coherent, partly stipulative, ‘explication’ of that concept, 
then whether a proposed explication seems intuitive to ordinary speakers of English 
becomes a very minor issue. We doubt it is wise to use the term 'innate' to denote any 
such explication, but if the aim of philosophical analysis is explication then its method 
should be to assess the epistemic value of various proposed explications, in the manner of 
Mameli and Bateson (2006). It seems to us that far too much of the philosophical 
literature still wants to have it both ways on this issue, declaring that is in the business of 
explicating the concept of innateness for the purposes of science whilst appealing to 
intuitions about whether some trait is innate to support one analysis over another.  
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